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Briefing Paper Series |
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Bernt Pölling-Vocke (bernty@gmx.com) |
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Master of International Relations |
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Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand |
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Can we have democracies worldwide without the world system being democratic? | ||
Measured
against these core elements of the term “anarchic”, our world is
obviously not anarchic. 191 nations are currently members of the United
Nations, and even though the UN falls short of turning the world’s
system into a democratic one, it aims at uniting nations under common
standards and purposes, whether it are the noble ideas of disarmament,
migration issues, humanitarian aid or many others. At least
theoretically, the UN is supposed to be part of a global system of
checks and balances. Parts of the UN, such as the General Assembly, are
perfectly democratic with one vote per country, others, such as the more
powerful UN Security Council, have a very limited number of members and
thus less democratic. Sadly, but justified, the UN is heavily criticised
for failing to carry out its resolutions or being powerless if a
political bully, such as the USA ahead of the latest invasion of Iraq,
decides to ignore it. But
would we have more democracies worldwide if the United Nations or any
other institution governing above the level of nation-states would be
more democratic? Could one not argue quite provokingly that the forceful,
yet currently unsuccessful, democratic transformation of Afghanistan or
Iraq increases the global quantity of democracies? UN recommendations
might have been ignored, at least in the case of Iraq, which casts a
dark cloud over the actual power of the world’s most democratic,
supranational institution, but given a few years and a currently
unpredictable outcome, wouldn’t it be possible that democratic thought
has a spill-over-effect on neighbouring nations? Don’t the foreign
policies of the US prove that the system is indeed inherently anarchic?
Does this hinder democratic reforms that would otherwise occur on their
own, for example in the remaining two countries of the famous axis of
evil? And
if the world is indeed anarchic, doesn’t the fact that the number of
true democratic societies has grown from 44 in 1985 to 82 in 2000
(United Nations, 2002) proof that it does not matter? That rational
thought on the level of each nation-state will prevail, given sufficient
time? Does a democratic, global community have the legitimacy to spread
democracy by force? If
democracy is an antidote to war, as many scholars argue within the
context of the democratic peace proposition, wouldn’t it be safe to
assume that most countries identify the benefits of liberal
internationalism as a “final form of human government” on terms with
their own, realist quest for survival? Can remaining authoritarian and
unrepresentative elites hold on to their undemocratic status quo forever?
Does a change in policies have to be forced from the outside, or will
every nation, in the pursuit of lasting peace and prosperity, pressure
its leaders towards democratic changes at some point of time? What
is required for democratic reforms within a nation? Would a tribal
country such as Afghanistan benefit from global world governance? How
could lasting, democratic reforms be introduced to a nation that has a
long way to go in its process of nation-building, the most important
prerequisite for a working democracy on the national level? If we assume
that this is not possible without outside help in underdeveloped
countries without national identities, how do we approach the task? Do
we have any legitimacy to do so? Would it be morally sound if a
democratic world government would decide to educate “poor Afghans”
out of their “tribal misery” against their will? Obviously,
a single page does not even allow to portray all the further questions
surrounding the original topic of this briefing paper. Nevertheless, a
conclusion shall follow: The
global spread of democracy cannot be halted, which does not mean that
the whole world will become democratic on its own. The prospect of peace
and the spirit of commerce continuously push the world’s majority
towards democratisation, as democratic societies, in which civil
liberties are as protected as market relations prevail, can have a
global analogue: a peaceful global order. Some parts of the world might
not follow the western route towards political modernisation, but the
idea of limited power seems to spread and might serve as a stepping
stone towards further democratic reforms, at least in partially
developed areas of the globe. A truly democratic world order could
fasten the spread of democracy via a “tyranny of the majority”
approach to global reform. The end results could be much more efficient
than the contemporary “terror of the emperor” policies (Chomsky),
which try to spread democracy via cruise missiles, bombs and culturally
insufficiently trained personal. Acting together with a rationally
driven coalition of the willing and in hope of an enlarged pacific
federation, the motives are purely controlled by a realist
interpretation of the world. Without
a doubt, a democratic world, leading by example and recognition of
natural law, would be a preferable marketing tool towards
democratisation. Nevertheless, the rational decision to opt for a
democratic form of government can spread worldwide even without a
democratic world system. The absence of global democratic governance
does not change the fact that a globalized world with an increasingly
neo-liberalistic economy requires internationalistic state-leading and
stable political conditions, which can be best achieved by the
implementation of a system Winston Churchill once described as “the
worst form of government except all those other forms that have been
tried from time to time”: democracy. |